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Uber EatsBOSTON TECH WEEK 2026 Top-10 finalist

Ever waste ten minutes scrolling a food app with no idea what to order?

Friends’ Picks

See what your friends order, and decide faster with recommendations you already trust.

Role
Product Manager (concept)
Research
24 interviews
Behavioural metric
Time-to-order
Business outcome
Order conversion
  1. Too much choice
  2. Decision friction
  3. Trusted recommendation
  4. Faster decision
  5. More completed orders
At a glanceIllustrative product hypothesis. Not observed Uber Eats data

The problem

Busy people face too many restaurant choices and too little time. That overload causes friction and abandoned orders.

My role

Product Manager (concept). I ran the 24-user research, framed the problem, wrote the hypothesis and metric tree, designed the experiment, and built the prototype.

Hypothesis

Recommendations from trusted friends cut decision time and drive more completed orders than another algorithmic list.

What I would watch

Order completion rate as primary. Decision time, recommendation CTR, and repeat orders as secondary. Order value and satisfaction as guardrails.
01The problem

Too many choices, too little time

Uber Eats has already solved supply and delivery. What it hasn't solved is the minutes a hungry person spends scrolling before they commit, or the sessions that end with no order at all.

The friction loop

  1. 01

    Too many choices

    Hundreds of good options, no reason to pick one.

  2. 02

    Browsing

    Scrolling replaces deciding.

  3. 03

    Comparing

    Ratings, photos, and delivery times all blur together.

  4. 04

    Second-guessing

    Every option seems fine, so none feels right.

  5. 05

    Longer decision time

    Effort climbs while appetite and patience drop.

  6. 06

    Potential abandonment

    The session ends with no order.

The behavioural metric

Time‑to‑order

The time between opening the app and placing an order. It's the clearest proxy for decision cost. When deciding gets easier, this number drops, and abandonment should drop with it.

Proposed metric

02Who this is for

Time-poor decision makers

Not everyone struggles here. The people who do share one trait: deciding costs more than the time they have for it.

Young professionalsStudentsParents & caregiversPeople working long hours

Needs

  • A decision they can defend in seconds
  • Confidence they won't regret the order
  • A shortcut that respects their taste

Behaviours

  • Open the app already hungry and already late
  • Scroll broadly, open a few, compare many
  • Fall back on the same handful of safe orders

Frictions

  • Undifferentiated ratings from strangers
  • Fear of wasting money on an unknown place
  • Decision fatigue at the end of a long day
03User research

I interviewed 24 people.

Semi-structured 1:1 interviews, focused on how people decide what to eat when they are short on time. Qualitative and directional. No statistical claims are made from this sample.

What I asked: the six areas

01

How people decide what to eat

Walk me through the last time you ordered delivery. Where did you start, and what made you land on that restaurant?

02

Decision friction

What makes the choice hard? What are you doing in the minutes before you commit to an order?

03

Trust

What actually convinces you a restaurant is worth trying? How much weight do ratings and review counts carry?

04

Friend recommendations

When a friend recommends a place, what do you do with that? Where does the recommendation reach you today?

05

Abandonment

Have you ever opened a delivery app and closed it without ordering? What was happening at that moment?

06

Product implications

What would have to be true for a social recommendation surface to be useful rather than noise?

Quotes and findings here come only from the actual interview transcripts. Nothing on this page is attributed to a participant unless they said it.

04Key insight

People don’t need more choice.
They need a reason to choose.

Stranger signal

4.8★

2,400 reviews

Accurate, plentiful, and nearly identical across every option on screen. It weeds out bad restaurants but doesn't pick between good ones.

Trusted signal

“Sarah ordered this.”

“You’d love this.”

Scarce, specific, and personal. It carries taste and context an aggregate score can't, and that's what turns a shortlist into a decision.

Why this complements, not replaces

Uber’s recommendation engine is great at narrowing hundreds of options to a relevant few. It's weaker at the last step: giving someone a reason to commit to one. Trusted recommendations don't replace ranking. They sit on top as a tie-breaker at the moment of decision, and carry a personal signal the engine can't infer from behavior alone.

05Hypothesis

IF

Uber Eats surfaces trusted friends' recommendations at the moment of decision,

THEN

people decide faster and with more confidence,

BECAUSE

trusted recommendations cut uncertainty and decision effort.

This is a hypothesis, not a conclusion. The rest of this case study is about how I'd test it, and what it would take to be worth building.

06The product

Friends' Picks, end to end

Friends' Picks → friend recommendation → restaurant → checkout → order complete. The prototype is live. Step through the states to see the reasoning behind each interaction.

Live prototypeOpen in Figma

State 01

Friends' Picks in the feed

Why this way

Placed right at the moment of decision, above endless browsing, not buried in a social tab. A separate tab would be a destination nobody visits.

In the prototype

A compact rail of faces and dishes. Recognition first: the person, then the dish, then the restaurant.

Annotations describe intended behavior for a proposed concept, not shipped Uber Eats functionality.

07Strategic tradeoff

Should Uber build a social graph?

This is the real decision. The feature is easy to sketch and expensive to own. A social graph is a permanent obligation, not a one-time release.

Option A

Full social graph

Upside

  • Deep personalization from real relationships
  • Network effects that compound with adoption
  • A signal competitors can't copy

Cost

  • Privacy exposure around what people eat and when
  • Cold start: no value until friends show up
  • Graph infrastructure and identity resolution
  • Added complexity across the whole app
  • Permanent maintenance and moderation load
  • Notification fatigue that risks core engagement

Option B

Lightweight MVP

Upside

  • A fraction of the investment
  • Faster validation, weeks not quarters
  • Tests the core hypothesis directly
  • Almost no privacy surface, since sharing is explicit

Cost

  • No network effects, no compounding
  • Supply of recommendations stays thin
  • Understates the ceiling of the full idea

Recommendation

Start lightweight.

Earn the right to build the social graph.

08Proposed MVP

One share link. No graph.

The smallest thing that can test whether a trusted recommendation changes behavior: let a happy customer hand one to a friend, and see what the friend does with it.

01

After a good order

“Loved it? Recommend it to a friend.”

Prompt appears once, right after ordering, opt-in only.

02

The friend receives

“Joshua recommends this restaurant.”

Attribution and dish travel with the link. No account graph needed.

03

One action

[ ORDER ON UBER EATS ]

Straight into the restaurant, with the recommended dish shown first.

Proposed MVP

A concept proposal. Not built, not shipped, not an Uber roadmap item.

09Analytics

What I'd measure, and why

Select any step of the funnel to see what it means and what I'd instrument there.

Primary behavioural

Time-to-order

Does deciding actually get easier?

Primary business

Order conversion

Does an easier decision turn into an order?

Secondary
  • Orders per user
  • Recommended-restaurant orders
  • Repeat order rate
Guardrails
  • Cancellation rate
  • Privacy opt-outs
  • Recommendation quality (hide / report)
  • Notification fatigue

All metrics on this page are proposed. No Uber internal metric values are shown anywhere in this case study.

10Synthetic analysis / illustrative data

How I'd test the hypothesis

A generated dataset of 320 sessions, built to show the analysis approach. It's not from my 24 interviews and it's not Uber data.

SyntheticNot interview dataNot Uber data

Decision time vs completion

Do longer decisions end in fewer orders?

In this sample, completion drops as decision time grows. Directional only: an association, not a cause.

Illustrative synthetic data, not observed Uber Eats data.

Fatigue vs browsing

Do higher-fatigue users browse more?

Restaurants viewed rises with self-reported fatigue, the browsing cost this feature is meant to cut.

Illustrative synthetic data, not observed Uber Eats data.

Trust vs receptivity

Are people who trust friends more receptive?

Among exposed users, engagement with a friend recommendation rises with how much they trust friends' taste.

Illustrative synthetic data, not observed Uber Eats data.

Exposure comparison / generated sample

Current discovery

0.0 min

25.2% completed · 8.3 restaurants viewed

Friends' Picks shown

0.0 min

46.9% completed · 7.4 restaurants viewed

In the generated data, exposure lines up with a shorter decision and a slightly higher completion rate. That's an association inside a dataset I built. It shows the analysis, not the effect, and it says nothing about causality.

Illustrative synthetic data. Not observed Uber Eats data.

Which segment looks most promising to test first?

SegmentTrustFatigueDecisionΔ Completion
Parents / caregivers3.53.98.8 min+26.5 pts
Students4.13.17.7 min+24.5 pts
Long shift workers3.33.98.8 min+21.9 pts
Young professionals3.93.68.3 min+17.3 pts

On this generated data, Parents / caregivers would be the first cohort I’d target: the biggest exposure gap in the sample. With real data, this is the same cut I’d run before picking a test population.

Illustrative synthetic data. Not observed Uber Eats data.

11Experiment design

How I'd actually find out

A randomized A/B test on the proposed MVP. Designed, not run. No results are claimed.

Control

Current Uber Eats discovery

Existing feed, ranking, and recommendation surfaces. Unchanged.

Treatment

Friends’ Picks

Same feed, plus the trusted-recommendation surface at the moment of decision.

Primary
  • Incremental completed orders per user
Behaviour
  • Time-to-order
Secondary
  • Restaurant → order conversion
  • Orders per user
  • Repeat order rate
Guardrails
  • Cancellation rate
  • Privacy opt-outs
  • Hide / report rate
  • Notification fatigue
  • Restaurant concentration

No experiment has been run. No effect sizes, lifts, or significance results are claimed anywhere in this case study.

12Business case / illustrative assumptions

Would it be worth building?

A framework, not a forecast. Every number here is a placeholder used to show how the decision would be sized.

Incremental ordersContribution per incremental orderPotential incremental contribution

Value side

  • Incremental orders attributable to the treatment
  • Contribution margin per incremental order
  • Retention effect if trusted discovery becomes a habit

Cost side

  • Engineering build and ongoing team cost
  • Social graph infrastructure (if pursued)
  • Privacy and security review, consent tooling
  • Recommendation infrastructure and ranking work
  • Long-run maintenance, moderation and support
Illustrative assumptions

No Uber financials, margins or order volumes are used or implied.

13Decision framework

What I'd do with the result

Committed before the test runs, so the outcome can't be rationalized after the fact.

Scale

Meaningful incremental orders, faster decisions, and healthy guardrails.

Iterate

People engage with the surface, but conversion downstream falls short.

Stop

No meaningful business value, or too much privacy and trust risk.

A feature isn’t a win because people click it.
It’s a win when it creates real value.

Decision boundary

What would make me kill this idea?

  • Friend recommendations don't meaningfully cut decision time versus current discovery.

  • Order completion rate doesn't move beyond noise in the treatment arm.

  • Social-graph adoption stays so low that most users never see a trusted recommendation.

  • Guardrails move the wrong way: smaller baskets or lower satisfaction.

If the recommendation experience doesn't reduce decision time or increase completed orders, the cost and complexity of a social graph isn't justified. That's a decision, not a failure.

Final point of view

The question isn’t whether people would like seeing what their friends recommend.

The question is whether trusted social discovery creates enough value to justify the cost and complexity of building it.

I’d earn the right to build the social graph by first proving that trusted recommendations cut decision friction and increase completed orders.